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ABSTRACT
FISCAL POLICY, DEFAULT AND EMERGING MARKET BUSINESS CYCLES
Ömer Kağan Parmaksız
José Vı́ctor Rı́os-Rull

Developing country fiscal policy outcomes documented in data point to stark differences compared with developed ones. Most prominent difference is the excessive
volatility of government consumption and transfer payments and their positive correlation relative to output. This seemingly non-optimal behavior is puzzling since it is
in contrast with standard theory prescriptions and likely to contribute to aggregate
volatility. To study the possible roots of this I build a model by incorporating a
detailed explicit fiscal sector to what is otherwise a standard sovereign default setup.
The environment I define is one of incomplete markets that resembles small open developing economies with respect to existence of short-maturity non-state contingent
defaultable debt as the only tradable asset for the sovereign government and financial
frictions on private sector. I use this model to identify the contribution of market
incompleteness due to the commitment problem of the sovereign. The findings point
that the endogenous state-contingent borrowing constraints that sovereigns face as a
result of commitment problem in debt repayment is a major factor in accounting for
the pro-cyclicality of transfer payments and excessive relative volatility of transfers
and government consumption in these countries. The effect of financial frictions of
the type defined as working capital constraint on an imported input combined with
debt sensitive private borrowing cost is increased volatility of fiscal policy due to debt
loosing its buffer-stock property in smoothing out shocks to fiscal revenues.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate and understand the dynamics and
linkage between emerging market business cycles and the conduct of fiscal policy in
these small open economies. Developing open economy business cycle dynamics differ
in many dimensions compared with their developed counterparts. While business cycles in developing world seem to get smoother over the decades, developing markets
still have been experiencing rather large fluctuations. Among other work, Neumeyer
and Perri (2005) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) find that, on average the volatility
of output is twice, volatility of consumption relative to output and volatility of real
interest rate is roughly one and a half times more in developing economies respectively. The discrepancy among these two groups of economies is not limited only to
private aggregates. Fiscal policy related aggregates as outcome of policy also seem
to behave different along the cycle across these countries. Standard theory based
normative policy prescriptions, under complete market conditions would call for a
stable discretionary government consumption spending, a-cyclical or counter-cyclical
1

tax rates and counter-cyclical transfer payments, smoothing out the provisions and
distortions created in provision of fiscal outlays. This seems to be roughly the case
in developed world, on the contrary, in developing countries, cyclical component of
government expenditures seem to be excessively volatile and their correlation with
output is and positively correlated.1 . My work focuses on the fiscal dimension of these
differences and attempts to provide a theory that accounts for them.
In Chapter 2, I begin by providing a description and analysis of fiscal policy
aggregates and document the differences in fiscal policy actions and their outcomes
between developing and developed economies. I also briefly document the well known
facts about the business cycle properties and highlight the dissimilarities. The set of
empirical observations that point out the stark differences in terms of documented
facts between these economies will lay out the motivation for our work and provide
the structure for the quantitative exercises.
In Chapter 3, I investigate the optimal fiscal policy under the option of default for
a fiscal authority where the government is the only agent with access to international
borrowing. My contribution in this chapter is twofold. First, from an applied point
of view I add on to the existing literature by accounting for another important dimension of fiscal policy property akin to less developed economies, that is excessively
volatile as well as pro-cyclical fiscal aggregates. My model, calibrated to a typical
1

I use the term pro-cyclical fiscal policy to denote positive and high government consumption
and transfer expenditure-output correlation for the cyclical component.

2

emerging market economy, is able to match the pro-cyclical and volatile nature of
policy making jointly, not a question addressed in literature before to the best of my
knowledge. Second, I provide a framework in which the way government deliver fiscal
resources to the private sector potentially matter, both in terms of default incentives
and output dynamics, a point not regarded in relevant literature so far. Overall, this
chapter highlights the importance of accounting for the functional roles of different
government outlays and dynamics of the interaction of government and household
budgets investigating the spillovers from government budget constraint to private
sector.

In Chapter 4, I look into the interaction of financial frictions faced by private
and public sectors in these economies in an effort to provide a framework that would
assess the relevance of financial frictions in generating observed outcomes. Financing
frictions on firms in the form of working capital constraints has been an important
model feature in accounting for emerging market business cycle properties in the
literature. Neumeyer and Perri (2005) show that exogenous interest rate shocks that
are negatively correlated with country fundamentals combined with these wedges
does a good job replicating observed emerging market business cycles. Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006b) report similar findings and among other candidates Chang and
Fernández (2010)’s Bayesian encompassing model assigns a significant role in terms
of likelihood to interest rate shocks and financial frictions jointly to account for the
3

documented facts. Evidence reported from many other studies also point out the
importance of these wedges from a modeling perspective in matching the excessive
business cycle volatility (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006b; Cicco et al., 2006, among
others).

I build a model with endogenous output and interest rate with an explicit fiscal
sector providing public consumption and transfers to households financed by income
taxation and debt issue. I introduce the financial frictions faced by the private sector
in the form of working capital constraint on an imported factor of production. The
firms’ financing costs for borrowing against this constraint is set as a consequence
of government borrowing, that is both public and private sectors face the same borrowing rate determined by government indebtness. In such an environment, we have
a dynamic interaction between government’s willingness to use debt for public good
provision and alleviation of tax distortions, and output. This feature of our model
that generate an financial linkage between and distortionary government policy and
private sectors does not exist in existing literature. The interaction works from fiscal
authorities actions and constraints to factor prices and tax rate private sector face
and becomes a source of disturbance on private sector. In particular, difficulties in
government’s budget constraint, translate into financing difficulties for private sector
that has a negative effect on output. The evidence do support such linkages exist
not just in times of severe crises but throughout normal times as well in developing
4

countries (Mendoza and Yue, 2008). To quantitatively asses the importance of this
margin, we calibrate basic parameters of our model economy to standard values from
the literature when available and estimate a set of them to match certain fiscal policy
and aggregate statistics of interest for a typical emerging market economy, Mexico.
To measure the contribution of financial frictions, we do a sensitivity analysis of different degrees of parameter controlling friction level, θ on the firms to measure the
effect of this margin on behavior of variables of interest. My contribution in this
chapter is to provide a framework that highlights this channel in emerging market
business cycles and investigate its empirical importance in accounting for the joint
excessive volatility of public and private spheres that seems to be a robust feature of
these countries.

5

Chapter 2
Facts and Related Literature
2.1

Facts

The real business cycle literature on small open economies dates back to Mendoza
(1991). In that work, Mendoza investigates the ability of a standard real business
cycle model with small alterations, calibrated to Canada, in replicating the observed
facts. His findings was that to a great extent it did. This however was not to say
the standard model was a success in accounting for business cycles in all small open
economies.
Table 2.1: Business Cycle Moments
Statistic

Developing

Developed

σ(y)

2.74

1.34

σ(c)
σ(y)

1.45

0.94

σ(r)

2.32

1.66

ρ(r, y)

-0.55

0.20

Source: Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)

6

As briefly mentioned in Chapter 1 and Table 2.1 clearly shows2 , the observed characteristics of a large class of such economies, namely emerging markets, exhibited very
different characteristics than developed ones . The most particular characteristics of
these economies that caught attention of researchers was the excess volatility combined with a strong relation between interest rates and output that contradicted the
insignificant role of interest rates in earlier models of standard business cycles in small
open economies (see Mendoza (1991), and Correia et al. (1995)). These earlier models, as they were defined, lacked the possibility of explaining a fact most emerging
market economies had to live with, which is frequent and significant fluctuations in
their cost of financing on external borrowing in international markets and its countercyclical nature with their output. For these countries with relatively less developed
financial systems and inadequate national saving, external borrowing was and still is
an important source of finance for growth. Also excess macroeconomic volatility and
considering most of them are in an transitional growth path, access to international
borrowing is crucial for consumption smoothing as well. Experience show that trouble for these countries in international financial markets, which appears as capital
outflow, usually have real effects. Considerable amount of study has been done on
the area to understand the causes, consequences and dynamics of this relationship.
2
Sample for table 2.1: Developing ; Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Peru, Philippines, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey. Developed; Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland.

7

The discrepancy among these two groups of economies is not limited only to
private aggregates. Fiscal policy related aggregates also seem to behave differently
along the cycle across these countries. Gavin and Perotti (1997) was the first one
to document and point out these stark differences for Latin American countries. He
found out that each component of fiscal layouts was substantially more volatile for
the Latin American countries compared with industrialized ones, with the biggest
difference being in government consumption and transfer payments. Talvi and Végh
(2005) extended these findings in showing that these observations are not only a
feature of Latin American countries but also a common thing among developing
economies.
Standard normative policy prescriptions would call for a stable discretionary government consumption spending and a-cyclical or counter-cyclical tax rates that would
generate a primary fiscal surplus that is somewhat pro-cyclical, smoothing out the
provisions and distortions created in conduct of fiscal policy. As summarized in Table 2.2, this seems roughly to be the case in developed world. On the contrary in
developing countries, cyclical component of discretionary government consumption
and transfer payments are extremely volatile and their response to output seems to
be strong, such that resulting primary fiscal surpluses that are not pro-cyclical. Perhaps, what is more striking to observe is as a form of an insurance by the public
sector provided to households, one would expect especially the transfer payments to

8

be counter-cyclical in response to output fluctuations yet this does not seem to be
the case for developing world. Transfer payments fluctuates very strongly and seem
to follow the pattern of output over time. Suzuki (2010) for a subset of countries
reports the volatility ratio of transfer payments to output in developing world in is
twice as much in developing world compared with OECD average (2.86 vs. 4.27)
and average correlation with output is significantly different (-.18 vs. .20). For the
period 1960-20053 with annual data, grouping set of 55 countries according per-capita
income, we find for the countries below the 60% of highest possible per-capita income
(32 countries) the median ratio of government consumption-output volatility is 2.12
and correlation with output is 0.42 whereas for the developed ones (23 countries) the
same statistics are 1.55 and 0.12 respectively. The behavior of primary fiscal surpluses also reflects the differences in as an outcome of fiscal policy conduct. For the
period of 1988-2001 for 12 OECD countries, I find the average correlation of primary
surplus with output is 0.61 as standard optimal policy would suggest. For a sample
of 19 developing economies with a varying length of data availability on annual basis between 1970-2001, same statistic is only 0.04 for a set of developing countries.
Furthermore, behavior of transfer payments for the two sets of economies differ as
well. Talvi and Végh (2005) also find for the period of 1970-94, the correlation of
government consumption with output for a set of 20 industrialized countries is 0.17
3

With varying individual country data periods.
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(-0.02 for the subset of G7) and 0.53 for a set of 36 developing countries. Riascos
and Végh (2003) report using annual data, in a sample of 16 developing countries, on
average government consumption is 3.22 more volatile than output, whereas this ratio
is 1.54 in their developed counterparts. Catao and Sutton (2002),Manesse (2006) and
Kaminsky et al. (2004a) report similar results, for different time periods for different
subset of countries grouped by their per-capita income level, that point out the same
significant difference. Finally, Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) using an extensive dataset and
applying several econometric tests confirm that a developing economy fiscal policies
are indeed very procyclical.
Table 2.2: Fiscal Facts
Statistic

Developing

Developed

σ(g)

3.90

1.83

σ(g)/σ(y)

2.12

1.55

σ(T )/σ(y)

4.27

2.86

ρ(g, y)

0.42

0.12

ρ(ps, y)

0.04

0.61

ρ(T, y)

0.20

-0.18

Source: See Appendix A for data sources and coverage

From the revenue side concerning the tax rates, availability of data is limiting
factor for conclusive statements on their cyclical behavior. Kaminsky et al. (2004b)
report a negative correlation with output for inflation tax for the non-OECD countries

10
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in their sample, whereas it was positive for OECD members. Mailhos and Sosa (2000)
finds for the case of Uruguay between the years 1975-1999 all relevant tax rates were
procyclical. Talvi and Végh (2005) provides anecdotal evidence on how both Mexico
and Argentina raised taxes to increase revenues in the midst of the crises, furthermore,
fiscal austerity programs that involve tax hikes is not an uncommon phenomenon in
case of crises for these countries. This again, is in contradiction with orthodox optimal
taxation prescriptions.
We know from standard theory of insurance contracts higher risk faced in terms
of higher volatility would make access to credit more valuable for the need of consumption smoothing yet Catao and Sutton (2002), in a study on the emerging market
international borrowing, show that higher volatility implies lower credit ratings and
higher borrowing costs in international markets. From this perspective, regarding the
policy induced volatility due to pro-cyclicality of fiscal expenditures standard theory
would imply, existing policy making choices seem irrational for these country governments. Understanding the underlying causes of this puzzling behavior is important
and is the source of motivation for this study.

12

2.2

Related Literature

The theoretical part of my research is based on the sovereign default literature that
dates back to the work of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and the motivation, as mentioned, comes from another literature that focus on fiscal policy peculiarities of developing world. In next two sections, I will briefly cover these recent research agendas to
the extent of their connection to my work and identify the place of my work within
these two strands of literature. I begin by briefly covering the emerging market business cycle research that flourished recently and have began to utilize the link between
sovereign default and business cycle volatility. Then I cover the literature on fiscal
policy properties and differences of developing world and research that attempted to
provide explanations for them.

2.2.1

Sovereign Default and Emerging Market Business Cycles

The strand of literature that focused on private sector aggregates of emerging markets
began with treating the real interest rate movements as exogenous shocks and the
driving force of fluctuations in emerging markets (see Neumeyer and Perri (2005),
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006b) and Kanczuk (2004) among others). Combining an interest rate wedge that is working on production with exogenous interest rate shocks,
output volatility is amplified and models of this sort are able to explain a considerable
13

share of excess volatility of output and counter-cyclicality of interest rates. Modeling
interest rates exogenous, or their relation to country fundamentals ad-hoc at best,
could be seen as a shortcoming of this approach. Interest rate combined with productivity shocks partially succeeded in explaining business cycle fluctuations in these
economies.
Another branch of recent literature focuses on explaining the volatility of interest
rates paid by these countries, taking their excessively volatile output realizations as
given (see Arellano (2008), Yue (2009) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006a) among
others). The basic idea, based on seminal work of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and
on analysis on unsecured consumer default by Chatterjee et al. (2007), combines
default incentives of the sovereigns with their finance costs. In these set of studies,
the fluctuations in output is transmitted to fluctuations in risk premium the country
has to pay, which makes the real interest rate, composed of risk free rate plus the risk
premium, volatile. The link between output realizations and interest rate is based
on lack of the emerging market sovereign’s ability to commit to pay back the loans
taken. This inability makes sovereign behave in an opportunistic way, paying back
if and only if doing so makes sovereign better of than defaulting. Unlike an usual
insurance contract, these models was able to generate higher incentives for default
when the output realization is low, thus fluctuations in output is mirrored in real
interest rate through default incentives and counter-cyclical dynamics. In these set of

14

models, the output is exogenous and decision maker, the sovereign, is treated as the
sole actor behaving on behalf of the country with respect to borrowing and default
choice with only constraint it has to optimize under being the resource constraint.
In this respect, this strand of models keep out the output dynamics exogenously in
one side and look into primarily on other business cycle aggregates and dynamics
instigated by the output dynamics.
Finally Mendoza and Yue (2008) brings together two strands by endogenizing
output and interest rates by having defaultable government debt and working capital
requirement on firms. The way they make the connection is through their assumption
of average firm’s inability to borrow in better terms than its sovereign. This combined with the existing frictions in previous models on production decision in form
of working capital requirement makes interest rate-output dynamic endogenous in
both directions. Their important and critical assumption about the relation between
private and public borrowing rates is not without empirical support. Thus sovereign’s
actions are directly linked with production decisions within this framework and does
well accounting for both business cycle and sovereign default dynamics simultaneously. Similar to previous work on the area, Mendoza and Yue (2008) also find that
the financing wedge on firms acts as a propagation mechanism in amplifying the productivity shocks and having an important role in generating the excessive volatility
and default episodes observed in these countries.

15

In Mendoza and Yue (2008), as well as the other mentioned studies of default,
government is a passive entity, simply transferring the necessary optimal borrowing to
households through non-distortionary lump-sum transfers and economy-wide resource
constraint is the only one that matters. The lack of explicit public sector existence
with a budget constraint makes the sovereign in these default risk models more like a
central planner that coordinates private agent actions. Experience show that default
decisions are linked very much to fiscal balances and usually not just the default
itself but likelihood of default by the fiscal authority have important implications
for country output. Although mostly smaller in terms of size their industrialized
counterparts, public sector choices in these economies usually have more effect on
the overall performance of the economy. So as we will be more explicit below, while
taking the basic framework from this literature, I extend it with an explicit fiscal
sector that interacts with household actions, in a way that is likely to generate the
observed outcome as a constrained optimal.

2.2.2

Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries

Studies that attempt to explain the seemingly non-optimal fiscal behavior in developing countries can be grouped into two. The first group of these base their explanations
in differences of institutions and political structure. Tornell and Lane (1999) provide
an explanation along the lines of economics of public goods. They argue that in

16

economies without strong legal and political institutions that design and allocate
public resources, a voracity effect may rise. An increase in public resources in form of
fiscal revenues intensifies the competition to get them. Demanding without fully internalizing the taxation cost of the resources, public spending rise disproportionably.
Although there is some truth in terms of inefficient allocation of public funds in most
of these countries, this is a one-sided explanation at best. Talvi and Végh (2005)
offers an explanation that combines the higher volatility of tax bases these countries
face and their inability to run fiscal surpluses due to domestic institutional and political factors. The interaction between the ad-hoc convex cost associated with running
primary surpluses and the high volatility of the tax base generate procyclical fiscal
policy. As a criticism to both of these studies would be, as Gavin and Perotti (1997)
documented, the procyclicality is more severe during downturns and government expenditure usually respond to output falls relatively more and a similar voracity effect
would intensify the struggle for funds even more during these times and running fiscal
surpluses should be even harder politically. All the evidence of recent default or near
default episodes in these countries showed, no matter how politically costly it might
be, fiscal austerity programs comes into place usually during the worst part of the
recession.
Alesina et al. (2008) offers an explanation in a political economy framework by
arguing in corrupt democracies procyclical expenditures are a way of minimizing rent
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extraction of fiscal authority by the public. The public can observe output but not
government debt so when the output is high, they demand higher expenditures and
lower taxes to prevent waste of resources by the government, to push the government
to its debt limit with a re-election constraint. The consequence is procyclical government spending and counter-cyclical tax rates. The problem with this approach is for
the documented evidence for procyclicality is not a property of democratically elected
governments only, the time and country coverage of the data pointing this includes
non-democratic regimes and periods. Furthermore Thornton (2008) shows within the
African countries, procyclicality is actually relatively lower for the democracies.
The second group mostly take credit market imperfections these countries face as
the source of their behavior. Riascos and Vegh (2004) develop a neoclassical model
of fiscal policy in which public consumption provides direct utility to households and
government optimally chooses both the level of public consumption and the tax rate.
When the markets are complete, as expected the optimal government consumption
is acyclical, with government using state-contingent borrowing to fully insure the
households against fluctuations. When state-contingent asset markets are closed, with
the only asset available to the economy is risk-free debt, government consumption
becomes closely correlated output. Although their assumption of incomplete menu of
assets for these countries is empirically supported in terms of lack of ability to borrow
in own currency and much shorter maturities compared to developed markets, they
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put an ad-hoc limit on borrowing and misses the time and state varying borrowing
constraint these countries seems to facing empirically. Their model also generates
very high positive tax output correlations that are in odds with data.
Mendoza and Oviedo (2006) study setup is also one of incomplete markets without
state-contingent borrowing to investigate properties of fiscal policy in a small open
economy. Default is also not an option and the government is allowed trade assets
only with households, thus international asset market is closed for the sovereign by assumption. Households are constrained by their natural debt limit, whereas sovereign’s
borrowing limit is ad-hoc. They define a Markov Perfect equilibrium in which exogenous shocks to the endowment and the tax rate drive the model. Their model is able
to approximate several aspects of fiscal policy and debt dynamics for their calibrated
economy Mexico.
The set of studies that are most related to my work are Cuadra et al. (2010),
Doda (2007) and Suzuki (2010). Cuadra et al. (2009) and Doda (2007) focus on the
same question in a similar environment in which a benevolent government is financing
valued public consumption through distortionary taxation and defaultable debt while
facing technology shocks. They focus on the widely documented pro-cyclical fiscal
policy in these countries, which they summarize as the positive correlation of output
with government consumption. While over-predicting these correlations( Mexico .55,
Cuadra et al. (2009) model .97; Argentina .78, Doda (2007) model .99 ), they both
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fail to match the other striking fact of the fiscal policy in these countries, that is
the relative volatility of government consumption and since their models do not have
transfers, puzzling behavior of the transfer payments. Suzuki (2010) also with a model
sovereign default, exogenous endowment shocks, non-distortionary taxes and transfer
payments fails to generate the volatility of expenditures documented in the data.
I build a setup with a more detailed structure of fiscal expenditures, including
transfers as a part of government and household budget constraints. Different empirical dynamics of the types of expenditures and their interaction through government’s
budget constraint makes this is more than just an accounting improvement. Fiscal
outlays has four main components; government consumption, transfers and subsidies,
public investment and interest payments. Both models above focus on government
consumption only, with a fiscal authority providing useful public consumption through
distortionary taxation and borrowing. The point of interest on the expenditure side
for previous studies, that is government consumption, is only 40% of the total government budget on average for a representative set of developing countries 4 (Suzuki,
2010). On average transfers and subsidies constitute 32% of total government outlays
and as reported in table 2.2 has a relative volatility of four times more than output
and two times more than government consumption.
In light of these observations, in Chapter 3, my contribution is twofold. First, from
4

Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Korea, Thailand, Philippines, and Turkey
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an applied point of view, I add on to the existing literature by accounting for another
important dimension of fiscal policy property akin to less developed economies. My
model is able to match the pro-cyclical and excessively volatile nature of policy making
jointly, not a question addressed in literature before. Second, I provide a framework
in which the way government deliver fiscal resources to the private sector potentially
matter, both in terms of default incentives and output dynamics, a point disregarded
in relevant literature so far.
In Chapter 4, I look into the interaction of financial frictions faced by private
and public sectors in these economies in a similar setup that would jointly explain
the dissimilarities in business cycle properties of developing and developed world as
documented. Financing frictions on firms in the form of working capital constraints
has been an important model feature in accounting for emerging market business cycle
properties in the literature. In such an environment, we have a dynamic interaction
between government’s willingness to use debt for public good provision and alleviation
of tax distortions, and output. This feature of my model that generate an financial
linkage between and distortionary government policy and private sectors does not
exist in existing literature and no study within this line of literature focuses on this
particular dimension. My contribution in this chapter is to provide a framework that
highlight this channel in emerging market business cycles and investigate its empirical
importance in accounting for the joint excessive volatility of public and private spheres
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that seems to be a robust feature of these countries.
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Chapter 3
Fiscal Policy Volatility and Default
3.1

The Model

Our unit of analysis is a small open economy (SOE) with 4 set of actors, households
consuming public and private good and providing hours, firms owned by these households with access to CRTS technology, international financial intermediaries and a
benevolent government that conducts fiscal policy by provision of public consumption,
investment, transfer payments through income taxation and international borrowing.

3.1.1

Firms

Firms, owned by households, have access to the following CRTS technology,

yt = zt f (nt , it ) = zt nαt i1−α
t

(3.1)

where zt is productivity shock, nt is hours and it is the factor of production to be
provided by the government and more will be said about it below in government
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problem. To keep the production sector simple, it is assumed no stock variable is
used in production.
The firm maximizes its profits given the cost of the factors of production;

max πtf = yt − nft wt
nt

(3.2)

and the output share that corresponds to government’s input is an indirect transfer
to the households that owns the firms as profits.

3.1.2

Households

Households enjoy private, public consumption, provide hours and pay tax on their
labor and profit income. They own shares of the firms producing final goods that
is non-storable, hence the profit generated by them, and they do not have access to
asset markets to trade claims on future consumption. The household problem, for
given prices and government policy is,

max E[
c,n

∞
X

β t U (ct , 1 − nt , gt )]

t=0

subject to the following budget and time constraints;
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(3.3)

ct = (wt nt + πtf )(1 − τt ) + Tt

(3.4)

nt + lt = 1

(3.5)

where Tt is the direct government transfers. The factor share due to public investment
is an indirect transfer to households that owns the shares of the firms 5 . The utility
function satisfies the usual properties, the households solve sequence of consumptionhours problems given prices and policy. As defined, consumption good is perishable
and households are not allowed to trade in financial markets and the problem of the
households does not require a dynamic decision. The dynamics of the model will be
driven by government actions responding to productivity shocks and the focus will
be on government policy behavior and its interaction with household choices.

3.1.3

Government

The benevolent government maximizes the utility of the households and is the only
agent with the ability to trade assets in international markets. State contingent borrowing is not available and government can only trade one period, zero-coupon, non
state-contingent discount bonds at rate qt . The amount of bonds bond holdings to
be repaid next period is denoted by bt+1 and borrowing implies bt+1 < 0. The bor5

Households are homogenous and per-capita shares are identical in equilibrium
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rowing is bounded below by ȳr , where ȳ is a theoretical maximum level of revenue
the sovereign can raise but in equilibrium, sensitivity of the bond price schedule to
total debt will imply a much tighter condition and this limit never binds. Unlike
most of the literature on sovereign default, our government is running a full-blown
fiscal policy with proportional income taxation and bond issue to finance its expenditures. On the expenditure side of the government budget, there is public investment,
government current consumption, interest on existing debt and transfer payments.
Public investment,it , is assumed to be fully depreciating 6 , and for the benchmark
model, tax rate will be exogenous 7 .
The sovereign government lacks the ability to commit paying back its debt. As in
standard Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) setup, the government only pays back its debt
when the value of doing so is higher than the alternative. The default alternative
clears all existing debt and implies immediate exclusion from the international asset
markets with a exogenous random probability of regaining access. The sovereign is
also not allowed to save when in state of default since with that option equilibrium
with debt is not supportable (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989).
The timing of the actions of the government private sector and events in a period
is as follows. Productivity shock {zt } is revealed first then government, conditional
6

Modeling public investment dynamically would complicate the problem with an addition of
another state variable without contributing to our results.
7

A version of model with endogenous tax rates will also be studied.
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on having a good credit standing, decides on its default decision on loans that mature
from t−1. The current default decision has current and possibly future consequences.
When a sovereign is in default, either due to defaulting this period or a default in its
history carried from past, it is not allowed to borrow or lend for that particular period.
A sovereign in default this period remain in that state next period with positive
probability 1 − γ and face the same consequences. Based on default position chosen
in the beginning of the period if that option existed or carried stochastically from
previous period as being in default, government chooses the amount of public good
and investment8 ,transfers to households and borrowing {gt , it , Tt , bt+1 } accordingly.
Given zt , policy {Tt , it , gt , bt+1 } and price vector {wt , qt }, firms and households solve
their problems. The state variables are the government borrowing bt , TFP shock zt
and credit standing of the government δt ∈ {d, nd}.
A sovereign in good credit standing, δt = nd, with assets bt < 0, i.e. with an
option to default, facing shock zt solves the standard discrete default choice problem,

V (zt , bt ) = max {V nd (zt , bt ), V d (zt )}

(3.6)

where for asset values bt > 0, V (zt , bt ) = V nd (zt , bt ). The recursive problem of the
sovereign with good credit standing that choose not to default in current period is to
8

As it will be apparent from the government budget constraint, I assume public sector has access
to a technology that can transform consumption good to investment good at a rate one
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conduct fiscal policy to maximize the welfare of households, for a given set of private
sector choices {ct , nt };

V

nd

Z
(zt , bt ) =

max

{Tt ,it ,gt ,bt+1 }

{U (ct , 1 − nt , gt ) + β

V (zt+1 , bt+1 )dF (zt+1 |t)}

s.t. gt = τt (πt + wt nt ) + bt − qt bt+1 − it − Tt
There is also an upper limit on borrowing as mentioned b0 ≥ ξ =

(3.7)

(3.8)
ȳ
r

to prevent

Ponzi schemes, and will not bind in equilibrium. V d (zt ), value of being in default,
with all existing sovereign debt cleared, government excluded from credit markets in
current period remaining in default with positive probability γ next period is;

Z

d

V (zt ) = max {U (ct , 1 − nt , gt ) + β
Tt ,gt ,it

[(1 − γ)V d (zt+1 ) + γV nd (zt+1 , 0)]dF (zt+1 |t)}
(3.9)

s.t. gt = τ (πt + wt nt ) − it − Tt

(3.10)

Property of the CRTS technology and optimality conditions from the static firm
and household problems give us;
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ct =zt f (nt , it )(1 − τt ) + Tt

−

Ul (ct , 1 − nt , gt )
=(1 − τt )wt
Uc (ct , 1 − nt , gt )

(3.11)

(3.12)

wt =zt fn (nt , it ).

(3.13)

Using the set of private sector optimality conditions, the state variable s = {z, b}
and policy vectors ψ = {g, T, b0 , i}, where prime variables denote the next period,
and approximating stochastic TFP shocks with a first-order Markov chain 9 , for a
given set of prices {w, q} we can re-write the problem of the sovereign that has not
defaulted in a compact form;

V nd (z, b) = max {U (c(s; ψ), 1 − n(s; ψ), g) + β

X

ψ

Γzz0 V (z 0 , b0 )}

(3.14)

z0

s.t. g =zf (n(s; ψ), i) − c(s; ψ) + b − qb0 − i − T

(3.15)

Ul (c(s; ψ), 1 − n(s; ψ), g)
Uc (c(s; ψ), 1 − n(s; ψ), g)

(3.16)

(1 − τ )w = −

w =w(s; ψ)

(3.17)

q =q(z, b0 )

(3.18)

where 3.15 is the economy-wide resource constraint. This representation of sovereign
9

The TFP shocks will be assumed to follow an AR(1) process
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problem explicitly shows the margins the government faces conducting fiscal policy,
it maximizes the welfare of its households subject to private sector optimality and
the resource constraint of the economy. Fiscal authority acts being fully aware of the
distortionary consequences of its actions on private sector behavior by internalizing
their optimality conditions. If the sovereign chooses to default in the beginning of a
period, it is relived of its current debt b = 0, excluded from credit markets this period
and not allowed to save, b0 = 0, the problem is;

V d (z) = max {U (c(s; ψ d ), 1 − n(s; ψ d ), g)+
ψd

β

X

(3.19)

Γzz0 [γV (z 0 , 0) + (1 − γ)V d (z 0 )]}

z0

s.t. g =zf (n(s; ψ d ), i) − c(s; ψ d ) − i − T

(1 − τ )w = −

Ul (c(s; ψ d ), 1 − n(s; ψ d ), g)
Uc (c(s; ψ d ), 1 − n(s; ψ d ), g)

w =w(s; ψ d )

(3.20)

(3.21)

(3.22)

Government’s default decision for a given level of savings can be characterized
as repayment and complementing default sets in terms of rest of the state variables.
For a debt level b, there exist a set of productivity shocks for which it is optimal to
default;
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∆(b) = {z ∈ {Z} : V nd (z, b) < V d (z)}

(3.23)

where Z is the domain of productivity shocks. Given the stochastic properties of
the shock process, this set defines the probability of default for a given level of debt,
which will characterize the pricing decisions of the international investors below.

3.1.4

International Financial Intermediaries

International intermediaries consist of perfectly competitive, risk-neutral and fully
informed agents. They invest in government bonds. They have access to funds at
the cost of risk-free world interest rate. Perfect competition implies zero expected
profits, that is equalized expected return on loans and the world’s risk-free asset in
equilibrium. When intermediaries are net lenders, their expected profits are,

π i = −q(z, b0 )b0 +

P r(z 0 6∈ ∆(b0 ); z) 0
b
1 + rw

(3.24)

where P r(z 0 6∈ ∆(b0 ); a) is the probability of government not defaulting and lenders
getting their loan paid back and rw is the risk-free interest rate. Profit maximization
implies,

q(z, b0 ) =

P r(z 0 6∈ ∆(b0 ); z)
1 + rw
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(3.25)

The discount rate on deposits, bt+1 > 0, is the risk free rate q(st , bt+1 ) =

1
.
1+rw

The model laid out allows us to investigate the effect of default option on sovereign
debt on fiscal behavior and . The dynamics of output is driven by productivity shocks
and fiscal actions of the government which creates wedges created by particularities
of a developing economy interacts with this.

3.1.5

Equilibrium

With the environment stated we can define the equilibrium. Before going on to that
step couple of words are still in order about the commitment ability of the fiscal authority. We already stripped the government of being able to commit to pay back its
debt and in absence of reputational mechanisms put a punishment mechanism making default costly in terms of utility to have equilibrium with debt. Our environment
consist of small households that take current and future policy as given, government
on the other hand is aware of the fact that its actions effect private decisions directly
and possibly through expectations. The extent to which government can commit to a
policy announced now would warrant different equilibrium concepts. We assume there
is no within period commitment problem, once the policy is announced in the beginning of period, government has full commitment on both. The non-storable nature of
the consumption good, household exclusion from asset markets and the usual static
firm structure make private sector problem and optimality conditions, which appear
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as government constraints, static. In this environment, the interaction between the
private and public sector is solely limited to within period actions thus government
do not inherit a constraint with future policy or state variables for which the today’s
sovereign would have to announce and private sector base their expectations on, i.e.
there is no inherent dynamic inconsistency. State variables in this problem {s, b}, are
either exogenous or chosen by policy maker. Non-dynamic nature of private sector
problem leaves out the possibility of a dynamic interaction between private and public sectors and incentives for a Markov government to manipulate its successors à la
Klein et al. (2008). We also treat successive sovereigns to share identical preferences
and possibility of political disagreement is ruled out.
Definition 1. An equilibrium of this economy is characterized by,(i) Value functions
V (z, b), V nd (z, b), V d (z) and associated default sets ∆(b) (ii) A set of private agent
decision rules for demand and supply for hours, consumption; n(z, b), nf (z, b) and
c(z, b) , (iii) A vector of policy rules for transfer payments, public good and investment, and debt ψ(z, b), (iv) Price functions q(z, b0 ), w(z, b) such that;
(a) Given policy and price functions, decision rules c(z, b), n(z, b) solve the household and firm problems respectively and w(z, b) clear the labor market,
(b) Given the price functions and decision rules for private sector, policy rules
ψ(s, b) and value functions V (b), V nd (z, b), V d (z) solve government’s problem
and generate the default set ∆(b),
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(c) Given households and firms optimize, the function q(s, b0 ) is consistent with ∆(b)
and satisfies zero-profit condition of the international financial intermediaries.

(d) Resource constraint (eq. 3.15) holds.

The way we proceed in characterizing equilibrium will exploit the fact that households and firms can solve their problem completely as a function of government policy.
If default is chosen in the beginning of a period, the government problem also becomes
static and trivialized.
The interaction between private and public sectors in our environment is relatively
straightforward. Government acts as a leader within a period and announces its policy
in terms of default and based on that transfer, public good and borrowing decisions.
Households and the firms solve a sequence of static problems given policy and prices.
Consumption good is not storable and households cannot participate in asset markets
to borrow or lend and only endogenous state variable in this setup, government debt,
is chosen by the fiscal authority. In what follows, we will derive the static first
order condition and an euler equation (EE) for the government that characterizes
government’s decision dynamics given the constraints it faces10 .
The EE of the government is derived by using envelope condition to substitute
the derivative of the value function that appears in government’s first order condition
10

Even though the value function of the problem is not concave and non-differentiable due to
the discrete nature of default choice and dynamic first order condition will not be utilized for the
solution, this exercise is still useful for understanding the dynamics of the government’s problem
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with respect to debt. The way we proceed in characterizing equilibrium this way will
exploit the fact that households and firms can solve their problem completely as a
function of government policy. If default is chosen in the beginning of a period, the
government problem also becomes static and trivialized so the focus below will be on
the case in which fiscal authority chooses not to default. Writing out the economywide feasibility constraint, C(s; ψ) where ψ = {b0 , T, i, g} is the policy vector to be
chosen.

C(s; n, b0 , g, T ) = zf (n, i) − g + b − q(z, b0 )b0 − i

(3.26)

Note that, given private sector choice, the government budget constraint implicitly
defines a relationship between transfer policy T and state-policy vector {s; b0 , g, i};
χ(s; b0 , g, i, T ) = g − zf (n, i)τ − b + q(z, b0 )b0 + i + T = 0.

(3.27)

Under certain regularity conditions and a given state and public good-investment
and debt policy, there exist a transfer function T (s; b0 , g, i) such that;

χ(s, b0 , g, i, T ) = 0

(3.28)

i.e. equation (3.28) defines a mapping from policy and state to transfer payment
amount. Prices plugged from optimality conditions of the private sector with the
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feasibility constraint, household optimality condition 3.12 defines the optimal labor
as a function of policy and state vector, i.e. there exists a n(s, b; g, b0 , i, T ) such that;

Ul (C, n(s; g, b0 , T ), g)
+ (1 − τ )zfn (n(s; g, b0 , T ), i) = 0.
0
Uc (C, n(s; g, b , T ), g)

(3.29)

This is possible due to the time-line of the events, i.e. choice and policy sequence,
that is first current shocks realized, then policy is chosen and private sector acts based
on existing state and policy. So using this characterization to plug in for n in feasibility
and government budget constraints allows us to present benevolent government’s
problem in a compact manner below. With the policy vector ψ = {b0 , g, i, T }, the
government’s problem subject to its budget constraint, when default option is not
exercised is,

V

nd

(z, b) = max
{U (C(s; ψ), n(s; ψ), g) + β
0
b ,g,i

X

Z
Γzz0

V (z 0 , b0 )dF (z 0 )}.

(3.30)

z0

or writing out V (z 0 , b0 ) = max{V nd (z 0 , b0 ), V d (z 0 )},

V nd (z, b) = max
{U (C(s; ψ), n(s; ψ), g)
0
b ,g,i

+β

X
zz 0

Z
Γzz0 [

d

0

0

Z

V (z )dF (z ) +

z 0 ∈∆(b0 )

V nd (z 0 , b0 )dF (z 0 )]}.

0)
z 0 ∈∆(b
/

(3.31)
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The first order condition that characterizes optimal public good provision is;

Uc [Cg + CT Tg ] + Ul [ng + nT Tg ] + Ug = 0

(3.32)

where under certain regularity conditions required by Implicit Function Theorem
(IFT), Tg = − χχTg from 3.27. Expanding the term [Cg + CT Tg ];

Uc (zfn − 1)[ng + nT Tg ] + Ul [ng + nT Tg ] + Ug = 0

(3.33)

after some simplification we get;

(Ug − Uc ) + (Uc fn + Ul )[ng + nT Tg ] = 0

(3.34)

The first term is the usual private-public consumption trade-off from the feasibility
constraint, the second appears as a result of labor and output fluctuation due to
policy and depends on sensitivity of equilibrium labor to policy. Note that ng , nT can
be derived from 3.29 to give;

ng =

Ωc − Ωg
Fn Ωc + Ωn + Uc Fnn (1 − T )

where;
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(3.35)

Ωi = Uci (1 − T )Fn + Uni

(3.36)

and;

nT =

Uc Fn
Fn Ωc + Ωn + Uc Fnn (1 − T )

(3.37)

Similarly the static optimality condition for public investment after some simplification we get;

(zfn Uc + Ul )[ni + nT Ti ] + Uc (zfi − 1) = 0

(3.38)

For the generic optimal policy choice without default, letting z ∗ (b0 ) be the value
of cut-off productivity level for non-default for a given level of savings, we have,

V nd (z, b) = max
{U (C(s; ψ), n(s; ψ), g)
0
b ,g,T

+β

X
zz 0

∗ (b0 )
zZ

d

0

0

Zz̄

V (z )dF (z ) +

Γzz0 [

V nd (z 0 , b0 )dF (z 0 )]}. (3.39)

z ∗ (b0 )

z

Noting the fact V d (z ∗ ) = V nd (z ∗ , b0 ) for all b0 by definition, Vbd0 (z 0 ) = 0 and with
the Leibnitz rule the dynamic decision made by the government about borrowing
reveals;
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Uc [Cb0 + CT Tb0 ] + Ul [nb0 + nT Tb0 ] + β

X

Zz̄

0
Vbnd
0 dF (z(b )) = 0

Γzz0

z0

(3.40)

z ∗ (b0 )

since Vbd0 (s0 , 0) = 0 and substituting for Cb0 and Cτ and suppressing the variable of
integration dF (z(b0 )) rearranging and manipulations gives;

0

[zfn Uc + Ul ][nb0 + nT Tb0 ] − Uc [qb0 b + q] + β

X

Zz̄
Γzz0

z0

= 0.
Vbnd
0

(3.41)

z ∗ (s,b0 )

To obtain the government’s EE we need to substitute for the derivative of the value
function in 3.41 via the usual envelope condition. Letting optimal policy functions,
b0 = φ(s), g = ϕ(s), i = ι(s) and T = T (s; ψ, ϕ, ι), we have;

V nd (z, b) = U ( C(s; φ, ϕ, ι, T ), n(s; φ, ϕ, ι, T ) )

+β

X
zz 0

∗ (b0 )
zZ

Γzz0 [

d

0

Zz̄

V nd (z 0 , φ)] .

(3.42)

− q(z, φ)φ − ι + T

(3.43)

V (z ) +
z

z ∗ (b0 )

where,

C(s, b; φ, ϕ, ι, T ) = zf [n(s; φ, ϕ, ι, T ), ι]−ϕ + b

39

Taking the derivative of the value function with respect to b

11

; re-arranging and

canceling out the usual terms that correspond the static and dynamic first order
conditions we get;

Vb = Uc .

(3.44)

Forwarding it one period ahead and substituting Vb0 in terms of primitives and
decision rules in equation 3.41 we get the EE of the government that characterizes
the solution to its dynamic problem when it is not in state of default;

0

[zfn Uc + Ul ][nb0 + nT Tb0 ] − Uc [qb0 b + q] + β

X
z0

Zz̄
Γzz0

Uc0 dF (z 0 ) = 0

(3.45)

z ∗ (s,b0 )

This is a functional equation with policy rules of the sovereign as well as optimal
decision rules of private sector and their derivatives as its arguments. This gives an
explicit picture of the wedges sovereign has to take into account in its savings decision.
The margins are, the direct one effecting household’s inter-temporal consumption
margin and the policy wedge working on the household’s static consumption-leisure
choice.
11
Similar manipulation for the differentiation under integral as above eliminates all but the term
with Vbnd
0
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3.2
3.2.1

Quantitative Analysis
Data

To calibrate my model I choose Mexican fiscal sector annual data. The choice of Mexico is common in this literature since characteristics of its fiscal sector data conforms
with the documented facts and it has a default history. The detailed structure of the
model requires capital expenditures, subsidies and transfers, debt service as well as
government current expenditures. Thus the choice of annual data has two reasons,
one is practical from the fact that it is hard obtain reliable detailed fiscal data on
a quarterly frequency, the other relates to the decision making in fiscal budgeting,
which is done on an annual basis.
Main part of the fiscal data used is from Mexican Ministry of Finance, national
income data is from International Financial Statistics Database of IMF. From the
expenditure side, between the years 1990-2009, the size of government sector on average constitutes about 23% of GDP in Mexico. The current expenditure on goods and
services, which corresponds to national income account government consumption is
48% (See Figure 3.2.1). Capital expenditures and debt service both make up about
15% each and transfers are around 10%. Their second moments and behavior over the
cycle is summarized in table 3.1 and is in line with the average behavior of emerging
markets documented before.
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Figure 3.1: Government Consumption Expenditure (NIA,IFS) vs. Government Current Expenditure (Ministry of Finance, Mexico)
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Table 3.1: Mexican Business Cycle
Series

σ

σi /σy

ρ(i, y)

GDP

3.03

1

1

Consumption

4.39

1.45

.83

Government Consumption

7.17

2.36

.43

Trade Balance/GDP

1.55

.51

-.75

Spread

1.97

.68

-.45

Exp. on Goods and Services

5.23

1.73

.48

Transfers and Subsidies

18.7

.30

.49

Debt Service

22.3

7.36

-.23

9

2.99

.44

.57

.19

-.33

Fiscal Accounts

Capital Expenditure
Tax rate
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3.2.2

Functional forms and Calibration

For the preferences I use GHH (Greenwood et al., 1988) specification with a separable public-private consumption. This type of preferences is widely used in SOE
literature and has the property that marginal rate of substitution is independent of
consumption and income effect on labor supply vanish

12

. This type of preferences

plays an important role in allowing international real business cycle models to explain
observed business cycle facts in these countries.

υ

(c − nυ )1−σ
g 1−σ
U (c, n, g) = µ
+ (1 − µ)
1−σ
1−σ

(3.46)

The risk aversion parameter σ is set to 2 and the annual world risk-free interest
rate r is set to 4%, which are standard values in quantitative business cycle and
sovereign default studies. The curvature of labor disutility in the utility function is
set to υ = 1.455, and implies a Frisch wage elasticity of labor supply of 2.2, which
is used in SOE models (Mendoza (1991), Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Mendoza
and Yue (2008)). Government investment share parameter αm is set to match the
average public investment-output ratio for Mexican fiscal sector, which is 3.36% for
the relevant period. The probability of re-entry after default is γ = 0.22, which implies
that the country gets full access to international markets about 4.5 years after default
12

Doda (2007) using Cobb-Douglas specification finds very similar results as Cuadra et al. (2010)
that use GHH specification for almost identical models.
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on average. This estimate is in line with the estimates reported by Richmond and
Dias (2008) for the period of 1980-2000.
As discussed by Aguiar and Gopinath (2006a), a simple analysis à la Lucas shows
welfare cost of financial exclusion by itself is not enough to support positive debt
levels in equilibrium within this general framework and an exogenous output cost
is usually needed for non-trivial borrowing. Even though our model allows for a
potential endogenous output cost due to default, quantitative analysis have shown
us with reasonable parameter values, our model does not generate enough cost of
default to allow for non-trivial debt, so we also allow for an exogenous output cost
due to default. The particular specification used implies for better states of the world,
default is relatively more costly;

zt =


ẑ







zt

if


zt > ẑ 



if





zt ≤ ẑ

(3.47)

and this asymmetric cost of default makes the value of default less sensitive to productivity shocks and increase the range of risky borrowing (Arellano, 2008).
Productivity shocks follow an AR(1) process:

log(zt ) = ρA log(zt−1 ) + t .
45

(3.48)

Lack of data prohibits direct estimation of the parameters governing variance
and autocorrelation of productivity shocks so ρA and σ are (with another set of
parameters below) set to match the variance and autocorrelation of Mexican output.
Remaining parameters are calibrated using SMM are µ, β, ẑ, τ . These are targeted to
match average public-private consumption ratio, annual default frequency, correlation
of transfer payments with output, average transfer payments-consumption ratio and
average debt service-output ratio. Reinhart et al. (2003) reports Mexico has defaulted
on its sovereign debt 3 times between the years of 1901-2002, and no default has
occurred since, this gives roughly a 2.73% annual default frequency for Mexico. The
government current expenditure to private consumption ratio is 16% for the relevant
period. The average debt service-output for 1980-2005 for Mexican government is
5.0%, and the parameter τ is calibrated to match transfer payments-consumption
ratio of 3.00%.

3.2.3

Results

Table 3.3 shows that the model yields consistent results with the stylized facts of
emerging markets in fiscal policy and other dimensions. A common shortcoming of
these class of models is the unrealistic levels of debt stock they generate in standard
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Table 3.2: Benchmark Model Calibration
Calibrated Parameters

Value

Target

4%

Standard RBC

Public investment share αm

0.034

Public investment GDP ratio

CRRA risk aversion

σ

2

Standard RBC

Labor supply curvature

υ

1.455

Standard SOE RBC

Probability of re-entry

γ

.22

Length of exclusion

Value

Targets

Risk-free interest rate

r

Estimated Parameters
Discount factor

β

.82

Frequency of default

TFP persistence

ρA

.85

Autocorrelation of output

TFP innovation std.



.0095

Variance of otput

Public cons. coeff.

µ

.17

Public/Private cons. ratio

Default TFP cutoff

Â

.98

Debt service-GDP ratio

Tax rate

τ

.195

Consumption-Transfer payment ratio
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Table 3.3: Benchmark Simulation Results
Statistic

Data

Benchmark Model

σ(y)

3.03

3.03

σ(g)/σ(y)

1.73

1.65

σ(c)/σ(y)

1.45

1.20

σ(T )

18.7

43.2

ρ(y, g)

.43

.86

ρ(y, spread)

-.45

-.60

ρ(y, T )

.49

.46

ρ(y, tb/y)

-.75

-.40

ρ(g, tb/y)

-.74

-.60

ρ(T, tb/y)

-.85

-.65

ρ(g, T )

.81

.77

ρ(c, T )

.78

.62

b∗ /y ∗

.32

0.05
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Figure 3.2: Discount Rate as a Function of Current Productivity

setup and my model shares this characteristic13 . In terms of business cycle properties,
model generates a negative correlation between spreads and GDP as the sovereign
have a higher default risk in bad states of the world. The counter-cyclical trade balance due to state-contingent nature of the price schedule it face and excess volatility
across the board is also in line with data. In bad states of the world, the steepness
of the market discount rate overcomes overly impatient sovereign’s marginal utility
of borrowing and sovereign is unable to use debt to smooth out the effects of the
negative shock and increase level of consumption both private and public.
13

See Yue (2010) for an extension with debt renegotiation and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006a) with
third-party bailouts for versions generating higher debt levels.
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Figure 3.3: Asset Choice as a Function of Current Productivity

As in all types of these models, the equilibrium has the feature that default incentives are higher in times of negative shocks, which is in contrast with models of
enforcement constraints in incomplete markets (Kehoe and Perri, 2002). With the
persistent nature of calibrated TFP process, this is also reflected in price schedules in
figure 3.2. Note that default is a state contingent optimal action for the sovereign in
smoothing consumption of its households. In fact, the asymmetric costs from default
amplifies the role of default as a policy for completing markets. As Arellano (2008)
puts it, due to concavity of preferences net repayment is more costly when income is
low, increasing default incentives. For a highly indebted sovereign the available contracts might not be a useful instrument for consumption smoothing if the available
50

options without default cannot increase consumption relative to income and defaulting may be optimal. This is internalized by the loan suppliers and reflected by the
steep discount rates the sovereign faces. As a result, sovereign with higher shock
borrows more due to better terms of the contracts available (see figure 3.3)
The strong negative correlations of fiscal expenditures with the trade balance in
model as well as in data point out that international borrowing is an important source
of finance for fiscal outlays. The benchmark model does a good job of replicating
general characteristics of fiscal policy in Mexico. Relative volatility of government
consumption is high, with a pro-cylical character and strongly negatively correlated
with trade balance as in data. Furthermore, the model matches correlation of transfer
payments with output very well and generates excessive relative volatility for them.
The effect of market incompleteness on the sovereign combined with the commitment
problem has its toll on fiscal policy conduct and is able to generate seemingly nonoptimal policy.
The roots of pro-cyclicality of transfer payments can be traced in figure 3.4. The
level of transfer payments are inversely related to productivity shocks such that households get a lower level of transfer payments in harder times. From an constrained
optimal policy point of view this not so surprising, since productivity shocks results
in a fall in output due to lower level of demand for labor. This is likely to results in a
fall in household income as well as consumption. Sovereign with the only one able to
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Figure 3.4: Transfer Payments as a Function of Current Productivity

smooth out these fluctuations faces a tighter constraint in international markets when
it needs it the most. But at the same time concavity of household utility implies a
higher marginal utility of consumption, which relieves sovereign’s public-private consumption margin. The higher marginal utility of consumption means the government
can manage public-private consumption margin with lesser transfer payments and
public consumption. The net effect in this case results in a procyclical expenditure
structure. In the next section, I will look into the fiscal side from the optimal taxation by endogenizing taxes while matching the level and cyclical properties of transfer
payments exogenously.
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Figure 3.5: Optimal Government Consumption

3.2.4

Endogenous Tax Rate

In this section, we treat tax rate as an endogenous policy variable and investigate
optimal taxation in this environment. The transfer payments are treated as exogenous
function of income,

T(y; ȳ, π) = π ȳ(1 + |

y − ȳ
|)
ȳ

(3.49)

and the additional two parameters are calibrated to match correlation of transfers
with output and consumption-transfer payments ratios. The results are given in
table 3.4.
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Table 3.4: Endogenous Tax Simulation Results
Statistic

Data

Endogenous Tax

σ(g)/σ(y)

1.73

1.98

σ(c)/σ(y)

1.44

1.15

σ(τ )

.50

.54

ρ(y, spread)

-.45

-.70

ρ(y, g)

.43

.95

ρ(y, τ )

-.35

-.75

ρ(y, tb/y)

-.75

-.55

ρ(g, tb/y)

-.74

-.60

An important observation on emerging market tax policy is the counter-cyclicality
of tax rates as documented. The model with endogenous taxes captures this dimension
of data and still does a good job in matching other key facts. With the given structure
of the model, government’s interaction with households is through taxes and public
good provision. Unlike the benchmark model, our government now have another
option that it can choose to finance the expenditures, income taxation. Unfortunately
their cost of use are closely correlated as policy instruments. We already know that
cost of borrowing is higher during a bad productivity shock, and this is the time when
alternative ways of finance is needed most yet this is also the time when relative cost
of distortionary income taxation is higher. An indebted sovereign’s marginal problem
now includes wedge in household optimality conditions. The decision to default or
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not has to include the potential distortionary effects of taxation. The increased
relative volatility of government consumption due to endogenous taxation is due to
this new channel of transmission of shocks to production. When a shock hits, first it
goes directly to production as TFP, then it has secondary effects that goes through
government budget and comes back to production.

3.2.5

Sensitivity Analysis

No Default Case
To better understand the role of commitment problem of the sovereign on fiscal
procyclicality and volatility I do the following sensitivity analysis. Matching certain
statistics from the benchmark model with default and Mexico, I take away the option
to default from the sovereign, and ask the question how would a sovereign that acted
in the benchmark model would behave if there was no commitment problem with
respect to paying back its debt. Closing the model with a price schedule sensitive to
debt , we calibrate the model to debt/income ratio of benchmark and macro statistics
from Mexico. The price function is;

¯

q(b) = 1 + r + ϕ(ed/d − 1).

(3.50)

The value of ϕ = 0.00072 taken from Uribe and Yue (2006) and d¯ is set to match
the debt/income ratio generated by the benchmark model. The results reported in
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Table 3.5
The results point out important implications for the relationship between the commitment problem and procyclicality and volatility. As the borrowing constraints is
relaxed, debt is used extensively to smooth out fluctuations, this is evident in strong
positive correlations of main aggregates with the trade balance, which are negative for
the benchmark and endogenous tax models with default. In terms of relative volatilities this model generates a quite stable outcomes. The consumption and government
consumption is nearly half as volatile as output and 3 to 4 times less compared with
default model. Regarding the procyclicality of government consumption, even though
it is considerably lower than the benchmark model, it is still quite high. This is not
surprising since Riascos and Vegh (2004) and Mendoza and Oviedo (2006) models
with incomplete markets are also able to generate similar statistics and this is a well
known property of incompleteness in asset markets.
The transfer payments comparatively show a drastic change in cyclical behavior
and they become strongly counter-cyclical as theory would suggest. The volatility of
transfer payments however still remains very high, this has to do with the inherent
volatility that is fed into the model and the low transfer payment-consumption ratio
calibration that results in excessive fluctuations to keep consumption stable. However
this is not say that the benchmark model’s results was mainly due to a compositional
effect since for one thing excess volatility is a phenomenon regardless of the type of
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Table 3.5: No Default Simulation Results
Statistic

Data

Benchmark

No Default

σ(g)/σ(y)

1.73

1.68

.43

σ(c)/σ(y)

1.45

1.20

.77

σ(T )

18.7

48.7

43.2

ρ(y, g)

.43

.86

.82

ρ(y, T )

.49

.46

-.74

ρ(y, tb/y)

-.75

-.40

.74

ρ(g, tb/y)

-.74

-.60

.63

ρ(g, T )

.81

.77

-.47

ρ(c, T )

.78

.62

-.71

the expenditures and procyclicality is a property of not just transfer payments but
all other parts of the government’s budget in developing countries.

3.3

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have investigated the effects of market incompleteness, due to the
commitment problem of a sovereign in repayment of debt, in conducting fiscal policy. I have incorporated a detailed explicit fiscal sector what is otherwise a standard
sovereign default model to account for properties of fiscal policy outcomes in emerging market economies. The environment we defined resembles small open developing
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economies with respect to existence of short-maturity non-state contingent defaultable debt as the only tradable asset for sovereign governments. The model performs
well in matching the properties of business cycles and fiscal policy conduct in these
countries. One such particular property in the data is the excessive volatility of transfer payments and government consumption expenditures relative to output and their
pro-cyclical nature over the business cycle. My benchmark model with endogenous
transfers and government consumption, replicates these characteristics. Furthermore,
a version of the model with endogenous tax generates counter-cyclical tax rates that
is also a differentiating characteristic of fiscal policy conduct in developing world. To
assess the role of defaultable debt in generating these results I also calibrate the benchmark model without default and with only short-maturity non-state contingent debt.
The results point that the state-contingent borrowing constraints that sovereigns face
which endogenously rise as a result of commitment problem in debt repayment is a
major factor in accounting for the pro-cyclicality of transfer payments and excessive
relative volatility of transfers and government consumption in these countries.
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Chapter 4
Financial Frictions, Fiscal Policy
and Aggregate Volatility
4.1

Introduction

Financing frictions on firms in the form of working capital constraints has been an
important modelling feature in accounting for emerging market business cycle properties in the literature. Neumeyer and Perri (2005) has a model with exogenous interest
rate shocks that are negatively correlated with country fundamentals interacts with
a financing wedge on firms that does a good job replicating observed emerging market business cycles. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006b) also report similar findings and
among other candidates Chang and Fernández (2010)’s Bayesian encompassing model
assigns a significant role in terms of likelihood to interest rate shocks and financial
frictions jointly to account for the documented facts for developing countries. Cicco et al. (2006) find that that their estimated financial-friction model with country
premium shocks provides a remarkably good account of business cycles in emerging
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markets. Evidence reported from many other studies also point out the relevance of
these wedges from a modeling perspective in matching the excessive business cycle
volatility (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006b; Uribe and Yue, 2006, among others).
In this chapter, I look into the effects of financial frictions in conduct of fiscal
policy and their joint aggregate effects on business cycle volatility. I build a model
with endogenous output and interest rate with an explicit fiscal sector providing
public consumption to households financed by income taxation and debt issue. The
way of introducing financial frictions is in the form of working capital constraint on
an imported factor of production in spirit of Mendoza and Yue (2008). The firms
are forced to pay in advance a part of their imported input bill and financing of this
is done through intra-period loans repaid at the end of the period and provided by
international creditors at the ongoing market rate for the country. The explicit link
between government actions and private sector is through the assumption that cost
of finance from the international markets is set by the discount rates of government
bonds. This implies in the eyes of international loan suppliers, domestic firms are
only as credible as their sovereign in paying back their working capital loans. The
evidence do support such a linkage between corporate and sovereign borrowing exist
not just in times of severe crises but throughout normal times as well in developing
countries. Table 4.1, taken from Mendoza and Yue (2008), clearly shows that for
the median firm there’s a sovereign ceiling under which firm cannot borrow and the
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country risk and firm specific risk is strongly correlated. Also, Arteta and Hale (2008)
documents severe falls in credit of the private sector of a defaulting sovereign, which
points, whatever the reasons underneath possibility of sovereign default has drastic
consequences on corporate borrowing. To link default probabilities of sovereign and
corporate debt in our model, it will be assumed that all the payments through capital
account flows through public accounts and the sovereign diverts these payments back
to households as transfers in case of default on its own debt.
In such an environment, we have a dynamic interaction between government’s
willingness to use debt for public good provision and output. The interaction works
through fiscal authorities actions and constraints to factor prices private sector face
and becomes a source of disturbance on private sector. In our model the effect of
TFP shocks on private sector will have two transmission mechanisms on output, first
the direct one through the usual productivity fluctuations, second through government’s budget as a result of fiscal actions. The importance of the second channel is
a quantitative matter and to asses this, I will assume the existence of such frictions
to full extent and will calibrate my model to match the existing statistics of Mexico.
Assuming the data observed comes from a world of financial frictions I will measure
consequences of them by measuring sensitivity of the policy outcomes to different degrees of frictions friction on the firms, measured by the parameter θ. My contribution
in this chapter is to provide a framework that highlights the quantitative importance
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Table 4.1: Sovereign and Corporate Interest Rates

Country

Sovereign Median
Rates
Firm

Correlation

Argentina

13.32

10.66

0.87

Brazil

12.67

24.60

0.14

Chile

5.81

7.95

0.72

China

6.11

5.89

0.52

Colombia

9.48

19.27

0.86

Egypt

5.94

8.62

0.58

Malaysia

5.16

6.56

0.96

Mexico

9.40

11.84

0.74

Morocco

9.78

13.66

0.32

Pakistan

9.71

12.13

0.84

Peru

9.23

11.42

0.72

Philippines

8.78

9.27

0.34

Poland

7.10

24.27

0.62

Russia

15.69

11.86

-0.21

South Africa

5.34

15.19

0.68

Thailand

6.15

7.30

0.94

Turkey

9.80

29.26

0.88

Venezuela

14.05

19.64

0.16

Source: Mendoza and Yue (2008)
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of financial frictions of the defined type in emerging market business cycles and investigate its empirical importance in accounting for the joint excessive volatility of
public and private spheres that seems to be a robust feature of these countries.

4.2

The Model

The model is similar to the one in chapter 3 with an explicit fiscal sector and imported
input in production. There are 4 set of actors, households consuming public and
private good and providing hours, firms owned by these households with access to
CRTS technology, international financial intermediaries and a benevolent government
that conducts fiscal policy through distortionary labor taxation, public investment
and transfer payments.

4.2.1

Firms

Firms, owned by households, have access to the following CRTS technology,

yt = zt f (nt , mt ) = zt nαt m1−α
t

(4.1)

where zt is productivity shock, nt is hours and mt is the imported input.
There are two types of international suppliers of the imported input mt . One with
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superior technology of production that require a proportion of the input cost in advance and others with inferior technology but no such requirement. The international
m
prices of these two suppliers fixed at pm
s and pi . Since when the sovereign is in default

state firms have no access to international credit to finance advance payments, only
inferior technology suppliers are available for the firm. When the sovereign is not in
default the firms choose to supply from whichever is optimal to minimize total cost
for a given policy. The necessary funds to finance advance payments are obtained
through intra-period loans at rate rt which are paid at the end of the period after
production takes place 14 . When sovereign is not in default and psm (1 + θrt ) ≤ pim the
firm solves the following problem to maximize its profits given the cost of the factors
of production;

m
max πtnd = yt − nt wt − (1 + τ )pm
s mt − θrt ps mt
mt ,nt

(4.2)

where θ is the share of imported input cost that has to be paid in advance, τt is the tax
rate on imports15 and rt =

1−q(zt ,bt+1 )
q(zt ,bt+1 )

is the interest rate charged on working capital of

the firms16 . The link between government policy and firm problem is explicitly stated
14

See Uribe and Yue (2006))for a fully specified firm problem showing that the rate determining
the cost of intra-period working capital loans is the same as the between period rate on one-period
loans
15

The tax rate on income and imports is assumed to be equal and finance cost of imported good
is not taxed.
16 s
pm

will be calibrated to a value from Mendoza (2008) relative to numeriare consumption good
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in this as the two distortions fiscal policy creates are tax and finance cost wedges.
The optimal working capital is;

κt =

 m
θp (1 + rt ) if


 s


m
≥
p
pm
s 
i









m
pm
<
p
i
s

0

if

(4.3)

m
In state of default or the case pm
s (1 + θrt ) > pi firm problem is simplified to;

max πtd = yt − nt wt − (1 + τ )pm
i mt .
mt ,nt

(4.4)

Note that the relative price of alternative imported input supplies also governs
the cost of default. From a national income accounting perspective gross national
income is total production less cost of imported inputs, gdpt = yt − pm
t mt where
m m
pm
t = min{pi , ps (1 + θr)}.

4.2.2

Households

Households enjoy private, public consumption, provide hours and pay tax on their
labor income. They own shares of the firms producing final goods that is non-storable,
hence the profit generated by them, and they do not have access to asset markets to
price and pim to match a statistic from data such that pim > psm (1 + θr), where r is the risk free rate,
always holds.
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trade claims on consumption. The household problem, for a given government policy
is,

max E[

∞
X

c,n

β t U (ct , 1 − nt , gt )]

(4.5)

t=0

subject to the following constraint;

ct = wt nt (1 − τ ) + Tt

(4.6)

where Tt is the government transfers and is Tt = κt−1 in the period default is chosen
as government diverts firm’s payments on working capital to households as transfers
and zero every period else. The utility function satisfies the usual properties, the
households solve sequence of consumption-hours problems given prices and policy
and stated problem does not require a dynamic decision making by the households.

4.2.3

Government

The benevolent government maximizes the utility of the households and is the only
one with the ability to borrow and lend in international markets. State contingent
borrowing is not available and government can only borrow or save through a one
period non state-contingent bond. On the expenditure side of the government budget,
there is government consumption, transfer payments and debt service. For financing
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these expenditures government uses proportional taxation on household income and
firm imports.
The timing of the actions of the government private sector and events in a period
is as follows 17 . Productivity shock {zt } is revealed first then government, conditional
on having a good credit standing, decides on its default decision on loans that mature
from t−1 and consequently transfer of last periods working capital to households. The
current default decision has current and possibly future consequences. A sovereign in
default this period remain in that state next period with positive probability 1−γ and
face the same consequences. Based on default position chosen in the beginning of the
period if that option existed or carried stochastically from previous period as being
in default, government chooses the amount of public good, transfer payments and
borrowing {gt , Tt , bt+1 } accordingly. Given {zt }, policy vector {gt , Tt , bt+1 } and prices,
firms and households solve their problems. The state variables are the government
borrowing bt , TFP shock zt , working capital from last period κt−1 and credit standing
of the government δt ∈ {d, nd}. A sovereign in good credit standing, δt = nd, with
assets bt < 0, i.e. with an option to default, carrying working capital decision of firms
from last period κt−1 and facing shock zt solves the standard discrete default choice
problem,
17
To make default decision timing with repayment of working capital loans from last period
consistent, it is assumed there exists 2 sub-periods within a period t, t+ and t− that are arbitrarily
close to t and TFP shock, on which the default decision is based for a given debt level, is revealed
at t− , which is the time working capital loans from t − 1 is due.
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V (zt , κt−1 , bt ) = max {V nd (zt , bt ), V d (zt , κt−1 )}

(4.7)

where for asset values bt > 0, V (zt , κt−1 , bt ) = V nd (zt , bt ). Unlike the model in chapter
3, there’s an extra state variable that needs to be tracked, working capital decisions of
firms from last period. However, the working capital choice of firms is only a function
of current shock and asset choice of the sovereign and as will be shown in section 4.2.4
the discount rate can be recovered just as a function of zt , and bt+1 . The recursive
problem of the sovereign with good credit standing that choose not to default in
current period is to conduct fiscal policy to maximize the welfare of households for a
given set of private sector choices {ct , nt , mt } and prices;

V

nd

Z
(zt , bt ) =

max

{Tt ,gt ,bt+1 }

{U (ct , 1 − nt , gt ) + β

V (zt+1 , κt , bt+1 )dF (zt+1 |t)}

s.t. gt = τ (wt nt + Mt ) + bt − qt bt+1

(4.8)

(4.9)

m
m
m
where Mt = pm
s mt if ps (1 + θrt ) ≤ pi mt and Mt = pi mt otherwise.

V d (zt , κt−1 ), value of being in default, with all existing sovereign debt cleared,
government excluded from credit markets in current period remaining in default with
positive probability γ next period is;
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Z

d

V (zt ) = max {U (ct , 1 − nt , gt ) + β
Tt ,gt

[(1 − γ)V d (zt+1 ) + γV nd (zt+1 , 0)]dF (zt+1 |t)}
(4.10)

s.t. gt = τ (wt nt + pm
i mt )

(4.11)

Property of the CRTS technology and optimality conditions from the static firm
and household problems give us the set of private sector constraints that will appear
in government’s problem for non-default state;

ct =αzt f (nt , mt )(1 − τt )

−

(4.12)

Ul (ct , 1 − nt , gt )
=(1 − τ )wt
Uc (ct , 1 − nt , gt )

(4.13)

wt =zt fn (nt , mt ).

(4.14)

m
m
pm
t = min {ps (1 + θrt ) , pi }

(4.15)

rt =

κt =

1 − q(zt , bt+1 )
q(zt , bt+1 )

 m
m
m
θp
m
(1
+
r
)
if
p
(1
+
θr
)
≥
p

t
t
t
s 
i


 s





0

otherwise

(4.16)

.

(4.17)





Using these, the state variable s = {z, b} and policy vectors ψ = {g, b0 , T }, where
prime variables denote the next period, and approximating stochastic TFP shocks
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with a first-order Markov chain, for a given set of prices {w, q} we can re-write the
problem of the sovereign that has not defaulted in a compact form;

V nd (z, b) = max {U (c(s; ψ), 1 − n(s; ψ), g) + β
ψ

X

Γzz0 V (z 0 , κ(s; ψ), b0 )}

s.t. g = zf (n(s; ψ), m(s; ψ)) − c(s; ψ) + b − qb0 − pm m(s; ψ)

(1 − τ )w = −

(4.18)

z0

Ul (c(s; ψ), 1 − n(s; ψ), g)
Uc (c(s; ψ), 1 − n(s; ψ), g)

w = w(s; ψ)

(4.19)

(4.20)

(4.21)

pm = p(q; θ, pim , psm )

(4.22)

q = q(z, b0 )

(4.23)

where 4.19 is the economy-wide resource constraint. This representation of sovereign
problem explicitly shows the margins the government faces conducting fiscal policy, it
maximizes the welfare of its households subject to private sector optimality and the
resource constraint of the economy. Fiscal authority being aware of the distortionary
consequences of its actions on private sector, fully internalizes private sector’s response
to policy actions. If the sovereign chooses to default in the beginning of a period,
it is relived of its current debt b = 0, excluded from credit markets this period and
not allowed to save b0 = 0, diverts private firms’ working capital repayments, κ to
households as transfers, and chooses ψ d = {g, T } the problem becomes;
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V d (z, κ) = max {U (c(s; ψ d ), 1 − n(s; ψ d ), g)+
ψd

β

X

(4.24)

Γzz0 [γV (z 0 , 0, 0) + (1 − γ)V d (z 0 , 0)]}

z0
d
s.t. g =zf (n(s; ψ d ), m(s; ψ d )) − c(s; ψ d ) − pm
i m(s; ψ ) + κt−1

(1 − τ )w = −

Ul (c(s; ψ d ), 1 − n(s; ψ d ), g)
Uc (c(s; ψ d ), 1 − n(s; ψ d ), g)

w =w(s; ψ d )

(4.25)

(4.26)

(4.27)

where κt−1 = 0 if government is carried to default state not by choice this period but
by stochastic transition due to a previous default.
Government’s default decision for a given level of savings and working capital can
be characterized as repayment and default sets in terms of rest of the state variables.
For a couple b0 , κ, there exist a set of productivity shocks for which it is optimal to
default;

∆(κ, b0 ) = {z 0 ∈ {Z} : V nd (z 0 , b0 ) < V d (z 0 , κ)|z}.

4.2.4

(4.28)

International Financial Intermediaries

International intermediaries consist of perfectly competitive, risk-neutral and fully
informed agents. They invest in government and private firm loans. They have access
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to funds at the cost of risk-free world interest rate. As before, perfect competition
implies zero expected profits, that is equalized expected return on loans and the
world’s risk-free asset in equilibrium. Unlike chapter 3 the discount rate the loan
suppliers charge is also a function of the working capital choice of firms, that will be
a factor in next period’s default decision of the sovereign.
When intermediaries are net lenders, their expected profits are,

πti = −q(z, κ, b0 )b0 +

P r(z 0 6∈ ∆(κ, b0 ); z) 0
b
1 + rw

(4.29)

where P r(z 0 6∈ ∆(κ, b0 ); z) is the probability of government not defaulting and lenders
getting their loan paid back and rw is the risk-free interest rate. Profit maximization
implies,

q(z, κ, b0 ) =

P r(z 0 6∈ ∆(κ, b0 ); z)
1 + rw

(4.30)

where Z is the domain of productivity shocks.
Even though default set is a function of κ, probabilities of default still only depends
on b0 and z only and can be extracted through,

P r(z 0 ∈ ∆(κ, b0 ); z) =

X
∆(κ(z,b0 ),b0 )
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Γzz0

(4.31)

Given the state of the economy and asset choice of the sovereign, this set defines the
probability of default, which will characterize the pricing decisions of the international
investors only as functions of b0 and z, q(z, b0 ). The discount rate on deposits, b0 > 0,
is the risk free rate q(z, b0 ) =

1
.
1+rw

With the model explicitly defined, we now define

the recursive equilibrium of this economy.

4.2.5

Equilibrium

Definition 2. An equilibrium of this economy is characterized by,(i) Value functions
V nd (z, b), V d (z, κ) and associated default set ∆(κ, b0 ) (ii) A set of private agent decision rules for demand and supply for hours, consumption; nh (z, b, κ), nf (z, b, κ) and
c(z, b, κ) , (iii) A vector of policy rules for public good, transfers and asset choice
ψ(z, b, κ), (iv) Price functions q(z, b0 ), w(z, b) such that;
(a) Given policy and price functions, decision rules nh (z, b, κ), nf (z, b, κ) and c(z, b, κ)
solve the household and firm problems respectively and w(z, b) clear the labor
market nh (z, b, κ) = nf (z, b, κ),

(b) Given the price functions and decision rules for private sector, policy rules
ψ(s, b) and value functions V nd (z, b),V d (z, κ) solve government’s problem and
generate the default set ∆(κ, b0 ),
(c) Given households and firms optimize, the function q(s, b0 ) is consistent with
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∆(κ, b0 ) and satisfies profit maximization condition of the international financial
intermediaries.

(d) Economy resource constraint (eq. 4.19) holds.

In the next section, I will quantitatively solve the model to investigate the implications of financial frictions in an environment as defined.

4.3
4.3.1

Quantitative Analysis
Data

To calibrate my model I chose Mexico, a country with a default history and fragile
financial system throughout data period the from which the statistics to match comes
from. The quarterly national income account data is from International Financial
Statistics database of IMF, covers the period 1990-2009, fiscal data is from Ministry
of Finance of Mexico and statistics of interest are given in table 4.2.

4.3.2

Functional forms and Calibration

In this section the quantitative implications of the model by conducting numerical
simulations is tested. For preferences I use GHH (Greenwood et al., 1988) for the
with a separable public-private consumption good. As mentioned, this type of pref-
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Table 4.2: Mexico: Business Cycle Moments
Statistic

Value

σ(y)

3.43

σ(c)

4.45

σ(g)

5.81

σ(T )

19.4

σ(g)/σ(y)

1.69

ρ(g, y)

0.40

ρ(T, y)

0.32

ρ(c, y)

0.71

erences is the common choice in SOE literature due to their success in matching the
particularities of small open economies Mendoza (1991).

υ

(c − nυ )1−σ
g 1−σ
+ (1 − µ)
U (c, n, g) = µ
1−σ
1−σ

(4.32)

The risk aversion parameter σ is set to 2 and the quarterly world risk-free interest
rate r is set to 1%, which are standard values in quantitative business cycle and
sovereign default studies. The curvature parameter of labor in the utility function is
set to υ = 1.455, and implies a Frisch wage elasticity of labor supply of 2.2, which is
standard in SOE models (Mendoza, 1991; Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Mendoza and
Yue, 2008). The probability of re-entry after default is γ=0.055, which implies that the
country stays in exclusion for roughly 4.5 years after default on average. This estimate
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is in line with the estimates reported by Richmond and Dias (2008) for the period of
1980-2000. For imported input share in gross output we use ϕ = .14, estimated from
Mexican data by Mendoza (2008) for the period of 1993-2005 and corrected for the
missing capital share. The model’s relative price between inferior technology imported
input prices and superior ones with advance payment constraint,

pim
,
psm (1+θr)

also govern

relative cost of default and sensitive to productivity shocks through interest rate.
The price of imported goods relative to consumption goods is taken from Mendoza
(2008), which is estimated for the period 1993-2005, by the ratio of values of imported
intermediate goods to gross output in current and constant prices 1.028.
We also allow for asymmetric cost of default allow for non-trivial amounts of debt;


ẑ if zt > ẑ 





zt =
(4.33)






zt if zt ≤ ẑ
and this asymmetric cost of default makes the value of default less sensitive to productivity shocks and increase the range of risky borrowing.
Productivity shocks follow an AR(1) process:

log(zt ) = ρA log(zt−1 ) + t .

(4.34)

and lack of data prohibits direct estimation of the parameters governing variance
and autocorrelation of productivity shocks so ρA and σ are estimated with a set
of other parameters to match the variance and autocorrelation of Mexican quarterly
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GDP. Rest of the parameters µ, β, pm
i , ẑ are estimated to match, private-public consumption ratio, default frequency, debt-output ratio volatility and output drop after
a default episode for Mexico. The number of defaults for Mexico between the years of
1901-2009 is 3, which comes down to 0.68% probability per quarter. The government
consumption is roughly 16% of household consumption for the relevant period and
standard deviation of trade balance is 2.35. Mexico has experienced one default since
quarterly data has been available in year 1982, during which the output deviation
from HP-trend during the quarter after was 5%, we take this value to match the
output drop in default.
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, our assumption is the frictions are in full
force, i.e. θ = 1, and private and public sectors are generating the observed data
facing these frictions. Neumeyer and Perri (2005) uses the same value, with much
higher and volatile interest rates shocks than our model is likely to generate, and
on the the wage-bill which is calibrated to 6 times higher relative to output then
our imported input. Uribe and Yue (2006) also finds high values of θ is required to
match the data, so our running hypothesis is not implausible. The calibration exercise
will proceed with decreasing the value of θ gradually and observe the sensitivity of
the model to this parameter as a proxy to importance of financial frictions in these
markets in terms of policy and private outcomes.
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Table 4.3: Model Calibration
Calibrated Parameters

Value

Target

Risk-free interest rate

r

1%

Standard RBC

Imported good share

αm

0.14

Imported Interm. Inp. GDP ratio

CRRA risk aversion

σ

2

Standard RBC

Labor supply curvature

υ

1.455

Standard SOE RBC

Probability of re-entry

γ

.055

Length of exclusion

Value

Targets

Estimated Parameters
Discount factor

β

.95

Frequency of default

TFP persistence

ρz

.85

Autocorrelation of output

TFP innovation std.



.008

Variance of otput

m
pm
i /ps

pm
i

1.04

Output drop after Default

Public cons. coeff.

µ

.09

Public/Private cons. ratio

Default TFP cutoff

ẑ

.97

Volatility of Debt-GDP ratio

Tax rate

τ

.153

Consumption-Transfer ratio
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Table 4.4: Simulation Results
Statistic

Data

σ(y)

3.43

1

0.99

.98

.98

σ(b/y)

9.98

1

0.88

.73

.55

σ(g)/σ(y)

1.69

1.47

1.38

1.29

1.22

σ(T )/σ(y)

6.10

12.47

9.38

8.29

8.22

ρ(y, g)

.40

.79

.85

.90

.94

ρ(y, T )

.32

.40

.61

.63

.64

ρ(spread, y)

-.45

-.38

-.39

-.41

-.41

pdef (%)

.68

1

.70

.49

.22

4.3.3

θmax = 1 θ/θmax = .75 θ/θmax = .50 θ/θmax = .25

Results

The results reported in table 4.4 point to importance of financial frictions in conduct
of fiscal policy

18

. For a given level of debt and shock, figure 4.1 shows a decreasing

discount rate for level of working capital since incentives for default rises as the
transfers as a result of default rise with working capital. Aggregate volatility is is
not very sensitive to the level of frictions, this is in contrast with the general findings
in literature ((Neumeyer and Perri, 2005),(Cicco et al., 2006), (Mendoza and Yue,
2008)) which find these frictions usually work as an amplifying factor in transmitting
exogenous shocks to output. The underlying reason in this difference is the fact that
in our model, interest rate is endogenous and sensitive to fiscal policy. In such an
18

The volatilites in table 4.4 are reported relative to the benchmark model, θ = 1.
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1
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Discount Rate

0.7
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high
0
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0.005

0.01

0.015

0.02

Working Capital

Figure 4.1: Discount Rate as a function of current shock

environment, benevolent government has the option and chooses to let the fiscal sector
absorb the shocks and since interest rate is sensitive to debt level, it is the provision
of public goods and transfer payments that fluctuates over the cycle, minimizing the
effect of shock transmission through debt level and interest rate to output. This
can be seen in increasing levels of relative volatility of government consumption and
transfer payments as the level of frictions get higher.
Pro-cyclicality is also inversely related to financial frictions. As the level of frictions rise, both government and transfer payments become less pro-cyclical. This
seems counter-intuitive as with lower friction level, one would expect debt to become
a less costly tool for policy smoothing and the linkage between output and fiscal ag80

gregates should get looser. However, the sovereign in our model is always close to its
endogenous borrowing limits and in risky debt area. This makes lowering debt level
very attractive to the sovereign since in doing so it alleviates the borrowing costs on
private firms and increase output. So at the debt levels very close to the limit, which
is mostly the case in these models, the incentive to move away from risky borrowing dominates and pro-cyclicality soothes. This is also reflected in high volatility of
debt-output ratio, higher volatility of fiscal policy comes together with higher levels
of volatility in debt. We know from standard theory, high volatilities of debt as a
buffer-stock is usually implied by policy smoothing, but in our case, due to combination of debt-sensitive endogenous interest rate and working capital constraint, debt
itself is no longer a tool to passively adjust to fluctuations.
Another interesting fact is the default behavior of the sovereign changes considerably with level of frictions. Default is used much more often as a state contingent
action by the government when financial frictions are high. Considering the finance
cost of non-default, the relative cost of default is less with higher frictions at higher
levels of debt which increases the incentives of the sovereign to use default as a way
of partially completing the non-state contingent nature of its debt and this finding is
in line with Mendoza and Yue (2008).
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4.3.4

Conlusion

In this chapter, I have investigated the effects of financial frictions combined with the
market incompleteness and commitment problem of the sovereign, in conducting fiscal
policy. I introduced the financial frictions in the form of working capital constraint
on private firm’s imported input of production. The additional and crucial linkage
between the fiscal policy and private sector came in the form of sovereign debt sensitive
borrowing cost on working capital borrowing of private firms. To summarize, I find
that the level of financial frictions have important implications for the behavior of
the government and characterization of fiscal policy. As the cost of the debt within
this particular environment is no longer just the interest rate charged, government
optimally internalize the negative externality it creates through borrowing. Such
optimal behavior generates a fiscal policy, increasingly volatile and less pro-cyclical
in level of financial frictions.

82

Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this dissertation I investigated the the effects of market incompleteness and financial frictions in small open developing economies on conduct of fiscal policy and
aggregate volatility. Specifically I asked, what is the relevance of;

• Commitment problem of a sovereign in debt repayment
• Market incompleteness due non-existence of state-contingent long maturity borrowing
• Financial frictions of a particular type

in accounting for the observed differences of fiscal policy in developing and developed
countries with respect to pro-cyclicality and excess volatility?
In Chapter 3, I looked into the optimal fiscal policy under the option of default for
a fiscal authority where the government is the only agent with access to international
borrowing. I built a model by incorporating a detailed explicit fiscal sector to what is
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otherwise a standard sovereign default setup. The environment I define is an incomplete market setup that resembles small open developing economies with respect to
existence of short-maturity non-state contingent defaultable debt as the only tradable
asset for sovereign government. I use this model to identify the contribution of market
incompleteness due to the commitment problem of the sovereign and found that commitment problem is a key element in generating excess volatility through endogenous
borrowing constraints it creates on the sovereign but market incompleteness due nonexistence of state-contingent long maturity borrowing generates pro-cyclicality but
not enough by itself for excess volatility.
In Chapter 4, I look into the interaction of financial frictions faced by private
and public sectors in these economies in an effort to provide a framework that would
assess the relevance of financial frictions in generating observed outcomes. I built a
model with endogenous output and interest rate with an explicit fiscal sector providing public consumption to households financed by income taxation and debt issue.
I introduce the financial frictions faced by the private sector in the form of working
capital constraint on an imported factor of production. The firms’ financing costs for
borrowing against this constraint is set as a consequence of government borrowing,
that is both public and private sectors face the same borrowing rate determined by
government indebtness. In such an environment, I find that the level of financial
frictions have important implications for the behavior of the government and charac-
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terization of fiscal policy. As the cost of the debt within this particular environment is
no longer just the interest rate charged, government optimally internalize the negative
externality it creates through borrowing and this results in an optimal behavior that
generate a fiscal policy, increasingly volatile and less pro-cyclical in level of financial
frictions.
Overall, my results point to the relevance of the set of factors listed above in
explaining the observed differences in fiscal policy conduct and further research on
the area is likely to help us understand the roots and causes of seemingly non-optimal
fiscal policy conduct in small open developing economies.
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Appendix
Data Sources and Coverage
For Chapter 2, Table 2.2;
Government Consumption Data:Period of 1960-2005, 55 countries grouped
according per-capita income yearly data (60%), with varying individual country data
periods, 32 developing, 23 developed.
• Developing: Nigeria, Senegal, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Bolivia, Honduras,
Egypt, Mauritius, Ecuador, Philippines, Nicaragua, Thailand, Paraguay, Dominican Republic, Peru, Tunisia, Panama, Turkey, Algeria, Colombia, Malaysia,
Venezuela, Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Argentina, Malta, Taiwan,
• Developed: Czechoslovakia, Greece, Singapore, Spain, New Zealand, Israel,
Hong Kong, Germany, Finland, Italy, Austria, France, Great Britain, Sweden,
Japan, Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Australia, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, USA
Primary Surplus Data: Period of 1988-2001 for 12 OECD countries. Period of
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1970-2001, 19 developing economies, varying length of yearly data.
• Developing: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Panama,Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela
• Developed: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom,United States
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